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In the autumn of 1928, nearly a decade of relative political calm and 
economic stability in northern Ethiopia ended abruptly. In late August, 
the Raya and Azebo Oromo population of the eastern borders of Tigray and 
Lasta provinces of northeastern Ethiopia organized a massive raid on the 
adjacent lowland's Afar population, carrying off hundreds of head of 
livestock and killing those Afar who resisted, By mid-October, a 
kaleidoscopic pattern of raiding broke out along a belt extending from 
the Awash valley north to the Eritrean border, Retaliation, punitive 
sorties by local officials, several imperial army expeditions, and a 
direct military challenge to the central state produced an eighteen-month 
cycle of violence before the imperial state's full-scale mobilization in 
early 1930 forcibly put down resistance. 
The 1928-30 rebellion in northeast Ethiopia had consequences well 
beyond the bloodshed and economic dislocation in Ethiopia's northeast 
provinces, The imperial army's crushing of the rebellion led directly to 
Ras Tafari Makonnan's coronation as Emperor Hayla Sellase, and the 
suppression of the north's resistance sealed the political and economic 
fall of Ethiopia's northern provinces from influence in the modern state. 
Imperial politics provided an important framework: the rebellion began 
shortly after a virtual palace coup in Addis Ababa in 1928 and its end 
dovetailed with the death in 1930 of Empress Zawditu and Hayla Sellase's 
coronation. Moreover, the suppression of rural unrest in northeast 
Ethiopia and the defeat of Ras Gugsa Wale, whose leadership of a rebel 
army became the political symbol of the larger pattern of violence, 
brought an end to any pre tent ions northern Ethiopia's elite might have 
had about dominating the emerging Ethiopian polity. However, the 
rebellion was more than that; it reflected a deep-seated imbalance 
between the political ambitions of an archaic class of northern oligarchs 
who had dominated the highland social formation in the nineteenth century 
and the increasing pauperization of their economic base, northern 
Ethiopia's rural economy. Examining the nature of the rebellion, its 
economic base, and the method of its suppression is instructive about the 
state of the politics and economy of Ethiopia in the 1928-35 period, and 
it reveals an essential correlation between the rural household economy, 
the structure of rural classes, and imperial politics. 
Despite the importance of the series of events which took place in 
and around northeast Ethiopia in the late 1920s, no historian has carried 
out a serious study of the "rebellion, 11 nor did contemporary European or 
Ethiopian observers understand the full meaning of events as they 
unfolded,! The purpose of this article is to examine connections 
between political events during the north's challenge to Shawan imperial 
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hegemony, the nature of the imperial state itself, the organization of 
production and distribution at the grassroots level, and, especially, the 
nature of environmental and institutional changes in the rural household 
economy. With the aid of new data, including interview material recently 
collected in Ethiopia, I intend to follow the course of events during the 
rebellion and relate these to basic questions about the nature of 
production and reproduction in the northern Ethiopian rural economy. 
A careful examination of the available evidence on the sequence of 
events and political economy of the region reveals a great deal about 
rural rebellion in Ethiopia as well as the state of its political and 
economic development during the inter-war years, a time critical to 
development of the colonial state elsewhere in Africa. The rebellion was 
not, as some have argued, a single phenomenon - or even a unified 
political movement at all - but a series of localized responses to 
economic and environmental conditions in Ethiopia's emerging social 
formation. Neither was ethnicity ·its most salient characteristic, 
although it is commonly referred to in the literature as the "Raya-Azebo 
rebellion." But neither was it a class-based movement determined to alter 
rural relations of production. The rural unrest was, however, clearly 
rooted in local environmental and economic conditions; the political 
issues that led to Ras Gugsa Wale's challenge to imperial authority were 
epiphenomena. Ras Gugsa's defeat and death at the Battle of Aynchem were 
symbolic of a whole range of losses to northern Ethiopia and its future 
role in the modern empire-state. After 1930, northern Ethiopia mounted no 
further serious challenges to Addis Ababa's supremacy and slipped into 
political and economic insignificance. 
Sources of Northern Discontent 1920-28 
In the period between the 1916 coronation of Empress Zawditu and the 
eventful year of 1928, significant changes had taken place in the 
organization of Ethiopia's central state and the balance of forces within 
it. Power-sharing between the northern conservatives who backed the 
empress, the post-Menilek neoconservatives led by the minister of war, 
Fitawrari Habta Giyorgis, and the "Young Ethiopian" party of 
heir-apparent Ras Tafari had provided a stable, if at times phlegmatic, 
government. Movement did take place within this structure, however, as 
the increasingly mature and adept Tafari maneuvered to enlist the support 
of foreign legations in building a strong base of support among the tiny 
class of educated Ethiopians in Addis Ababa. He also campaigned to 
control governorships in the rich southern and western provinces which 
produced coffee, the key to Ethiopia's links to the world economy. By 
contrast, conservative forces in the government and in the provinces 
sought consistently to forestall foreign involvement in the economy and 
to resist policies like the abolition of slavery, Ethiopia's membership 
in the League of Nations, and the policing of unstable frontier zones. 
During the 1920s Tafari' s aggressive policies of centralization and 
modernization hardened political alignments between those who stood to 
benefit from reform and those who preferred the political and economic 
norms of Menilek's rough-and-tumble frontier state. The fundamental 
difference between conservative and reformist elements in the central 
government derived from their economic base and, to a degree, from their 
vision of Ethiopia's future. I would argue that there were three basic 
groups: neoconservatives who pursued Menilek's vision of a loosely 
federated oligarchic state and primitive accumulation, conservatives -
primarily northern elite families - who sought 
autonomy, and a 11progressive" party led by Ras 
build a centralized fiscal and political structure 
taken in Addis Ababa. 
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Neoconservatives at court tended to rely on the tribute and military 
strength of regional governors engaged in extractive activities in the 
south and southwest like slave raiding, ivory hunting, and the rapacious 
collection of tribute from frontier populations, primarily Nilotic, 
Omotic, and Cushitic-speaking groups which occupied the empire's south 
and southwestern regions. The aggressive imperial soldiery, usually 
first- and second-generation migrants from Shawa and the north, were a 
military entrepreneurial class which had grown wealthy on the booty and 
land available in the wake of Menilek's conquest of his southern 
frontier. The wealth and prestige of these frontiersmen derived from the 
presence of undelimited frontier zones which allowed them to raid for 
slaves, to hunt, and to draw tribute from small-scale societies with 
limited means of defense beyond flight or submission. In the richer 
agricultural zones the soldiers settled on prime land and exercised 
control over the labor of the indigenous population who worked as serfs 
and, later, tenants.2 
In the north, conservative leadership came from the empress's 
estranged husband Ras Gugsa Wale, Ras Haylu of Gojjam, most Tigrean 
leaders, and the rural military and ecclesiastical classes which wished 
to retain their direct control over local customs and revenues in kind, 
cash, and labor from the bundle of income rights called gult (and often 
glossed as "fief"). The power of northern conservatives derived 'from 
their ability to retain weal th within their governates by minimizing 
tribute transfers to the central government. Money and payments in kind 
retained locally were used to build constituencies among members of the 
rural producing class, local soldiers, peasants, and parish-level 
clerics. For office-holders in the north, the stakes were high, since 
their position at the top of the social and political hierarchy depended 
to a large degree on their retaining a consistent income from the 
perquisites which they, in turn, redistributed to loyal supporters, 
The support of conservatives in the north relied fundamentally on 
parish-level officials and peasant smallholders who expected to benefit 
from the redistributed largesse from the regional elite. In contrast to 
southern producers who worked under the domination of northern 
soldier/settlers, peasant households in northern Ethiopia enjoyed almost 
universal access to land through the ambilineal rist property system. 
While they owed taxes, tribute, and ritual obei~ to a hereditary 
church and military elite, their belief in their rights to claim land, to 
accumulate the means of production, and to claim a place in God's 
universe fostered a political and economic conservatism which resisted 
fiscal, administrative, or ideological change. 
The moral economy of subsistence which operated in the rural economy 
was the result of long-standing experience with the need to balance the 
demands of the physical reproduction of the household unit and the 
requirements of social reproduction which involved the regular transfer 
of surplus, in kind and in labor, to the church and civil authority. Just 
as military elite relied upon their incomes from gult rights, 
ecclesiastical authority in the north depended on the income-generating 
power of major churches and monasteries, called daber, which controlled 
tax collection, leased land (rim) to wealthy farmers, and administered 
justice. Income from these sources supported a growing ecclesiastical 
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class, which supervised the spiritual well being of the entire COIIDilunity, 
performed key rites of passage, and supported existing relations of 
production.3 
That economic reward, Christian salvation, and social mobility were 
possible for those households which managed their resources well 
contributed to the rural producers' incentive to minimize structural 
change in the political system. Social mobility and the single-generation 
family estate which resulted from the nature of property in the rural 
economy encouraged vertical ties between sponsors and clients rather than 
horizontal links within a class; taxes and tribute circulated between 
elites and producers in ways which generally maintained stability. Elites 
and officials at all levels in northern rural society manipulated these 
links to strengthen their own position and to resist the intrusion of the 
central state which sought to impose its own administrative priorities 
there.4 
Over the course of the 1920s, Tafari and his supporters who favored 
fiscal and administrative reforms proved a clear threat to both 
conservative and neoconservative groups. Tafari's party preferred to 
build state power by the consolidation of resources at the center for the 
building of a modern army equipped with imported trappings, a state and 
provincial bureaucracy maintained by regular allowances - if not salaries 
- and the state control of customs and courts. These plans provided for 
direct links between the imperial state and peasant producers which 
diminished the economic base of rural elites. Tafari's ideas about 
reforms were no secret: they had been previewed by his administration of 
Harar since 1906 and the beginnings of imperial administration in Wallo 
after 1928. 5 
The Ethiopian state was concerned with more than local administration 
in the north. In his capacity as overseer of foreign affairs, Tafari 
appeared ready to open Ethiopia to foreign investment and to monopolize 
profits and fees for the central government.6 He also acted against 
extractive frontiersmen, albeit slowly, by cooperating with limitrophe 
colonial powers to prosecute frontier raiding along the Sudan, Somali, 
and British East African borders, and by suppressing the more obvious 
aspects of slavery and the slave trade, thus shifting the central 
government I s fiscal foundations away from irregular tribute. 7 Whether 
from their vision of the future or as a pragmatic means of reducing his 
rival I s economic base, Tafari and his party encouraged the shift to 
cash-cropping, COIIDiloditization, and a rural proletariat. In the 
mid-1920s, under Tafari's direction, the former soldier/serf relations in 
the south and west in effect after Menilek's conquest had evolved into a 
more manageable, and profitable, landlord/tenant relationship based on 
the COIIDilOditization of land and production for regional and world 
markets.8 In the north, the centralization process emerged more slowly 
and along different lines. It took the form of the regularization of 
taxation, the control of customs by state officials, and the reduction of 
the financial prerogatives of the rural military class.9 
Over the course of the 1920s, Tafari's supporters pursued a policy of 
stabilizing a production base for southern Ethiopia based on cash and 
COIIDilodities by placing his own loyalists in provincial governorships 
there. Tafari I s control over southern appointments not only removed his 
enemies, but gave him direct access to a loyal military force. Far more 
than his much-touted modern personal bodyguard, southern provincial 
levies became the foundation of his power. In the north imperial 
authority had little leverage over land claimed as rist, while in the 
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south soldiers recently settled on the land owed their tenure directly to 
the imperial state. The 1926 death of the minister of war, Fitawrari 
Habta Giyorgis, is a case in point. On the old man's death, Tafari 
immediately took personal control of his Borana governate on the British 
East African border and therefore assumed direct means of controlling his 
17,000 man army as well. The central government's expansion in the north 
was considerably slower, but by 1928 Tafari felt secure enough to assume 
direct control over Wallo province and to negotiate a treaty of 
friendship and cooperation with Italy which called for the building of a 
motor road from Wallo' s capital at Dase to the Italian Red Sea port of 
Assab. In response to these challenges, already badly outmaneuvered 
conservative forces rallied for a series of poorly orchestrated 
challenges.1O 
In September 1928, the empress and her neoconservative backers 
responded to Tafari 's provocations and attempted a coup against him. It 
began with the march of the conservative governor of the southern 
province of Sidamo, Dajazmach Balcha, on Addis Ababa and ended with an 
abortive attempt by the empress's palace guards to take Tafari prisoner. 
Neither move was well conceived: Balcha surrendered without a shot after 
his troops deserted to Tafari's side, who then used his own loyal troops 
to stand off the imperial guard. Tafari's supporters subsequently pressed 
their advantage and demanded that he receive the title of negus (king), a 
largely symbolic, but nonetheless important recognition of his authority. 
On 22 September, before a festive gathering of Ethiopian and foreign 
dignitaries, the empress crowned Tafari as negus.11 
The response to these events outside the capital reflected the 
political interests of the rural elites and the geographic distribution 
of power within the empire. Few of the powerful in Ethiopia missed the 
significance of the coronation. Tafari's supporters in Harar, Shawa, and 
many of the southern provinces were enthusiastic; in Tigray the Italian 
sources reported "silent diffidence"; and in Bagamder there was open 
hostility from Ras Gugsa Wale, who had imperial ambitions of his own. The 
rural populations of the north were probably only vaguely aware, if at 
all, of events in the capital. Nevertheless, as political events unfolded 
they became keenly aware of their own interests, especially in terms of 
their own developing economic crisis. 
The local economies of northern Ethiopia, especially the northeastern 
regions of Las ta and Tigray, had long been in a state of economic and 
ecological decline. This economic stagnation was evidenced by the 
region's inability to produce goods marketable directly into the world 
economy, but also by the less-recognized economic crisis on the household 
level. Production in northern Ethiopia took place almost exclusively on 
smallholder peasant farms which relied on household labor, the 
single-tine ox-drawn plow, and a patchwork of scattered plots of rist 
land for the production of cereals and pulses and the husbanding of small 
livestock herds. As noted above, this agricultural system had long been a 
successful formula which encouraged individual initiative and allowed a 
degree of economic mobility within each generation. Both the church and 
local political institutions had proven effective agents for the social 
reproduction of local society while providing the economic and military 
base for the expansion of the Amhara/Tigrean political culture over a 
broad area throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century.12 
Despite its success in underwriting the maintenance and expansion of 
an elaborate state structure over almost a millennium, the agricultural 
system of the northern highlands depended on an expanding pool of 
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available land. By the mid-nineteenth century, population growth and the 
effects of a millennium of intensive (and extensive) cultivation had 
dramatically reduced pasturage, reduced the opportunities for fallowing, 
and exhausted fuel resources. Extensive cultivation made possible by the 
efficiency of the ox-drawn plow had spilled beyond the ideal altitude 
zones and pushed up the steep slopes of canyons and down into lowland 
valleys where productivity was sharply reduced. In these conditions, the 
chronic rainfal 1 shadow effects of the northeastern highland's climate 
and the periodic depredations of locusts and army worms common to the 
eastern Nile valley took a serious toll on food production. By the 1920s 
there is evidence that agricultural productivity had fallen drastically, 
household labor had intensified, the tax burden had increased, and 
capital shortages (especially a dearth of oxen) had forced many 
smallholder farms into developing a range of extra-household 
income-generating activities such as petty trade, the borrowing of oxen 
and seed, and raiding. In these circumstances the process of local and 
regional migration accelerated, including a dramatic increase in the 
number of clerics and indigent persons claiming support from church lands 
as well as others who relied on the largesse of rich households .13 For 
most of these activities, peasant producers depended on the capital and 
leadership of the rural elite. 
The state of the northern rural economy, therefore, bore directly on 
political events. The increased instability of peasant household 
economies chronically short of seed stocks and oxen promoted a 
willingness to resort to violence. Their discontent coincided with 
elites' unease about losing to state-appointed officials their 
prerogatives to collect customs, control judicial procedures, and 
maintain their own treasuries. Dry season raids into adjacent lowland 
areas and the ritual war games, called wayyane, had long been practiced 
by adolescent males; by 1928 the class interests of both producers and 
elites appear to have determined that raids be carried out in earnest. 
Leadership for such actions, however, fell to ambitious local officials 
who managed to channel economic crisis into political capital and 
violence. Those who were successful in leading raids for livestock gained 
prestige and could build a political following through the judicious 
redistribution of their booty. Rural Ethiopians were well aware that 
political mobility could often be achieved through banditry and the 
clever manipulation of grassroot support. Events during the 1928-30 
period therefore reflected both the machinations of imperial politics and 
the contradictions in local factors of production and reproduction in the 
northeast. 
The Course of Events in the Northeastern Rebellion 1928-30 
The first indicators heralding the 1928-30 crisis in northeast 
Ethiopia were the result of the area's capricious micro-climate and its 
impact on the area's productive capacity. In 1927, after a hiatus of 
nearly eight years, swarms of locusts appeared in the northeast and 
seriously damaged food crops in the major river valleys and especially 
along eastern lowland zones from Wallo to Eritrea. The far eastern 
highlands, as always, took the full brunt of the swarms. Rains were 
spotty in that year and ended early in some areas. Poor harvests and 
locust damage meant reduced dry season forage for livestock; off-take 
rates increased as peasants tried to reduce herd size by selling off 
household capital to obtain food and seed for the next season. The cycle 
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of micro-economic crisis accelerated when rural households sought to 
recoup losses by selling hides and skins from butchered livestock and 
found little succor. Prices in the world market were at a low ebb and the 
imperial government had already succeeded in driving much of the hides 
trade to the railhead at Addis Ababa, away from the better prices of 
Eritrea.14 
The raids which began in August of 1928 - normally the height of the 
rains - first involved Raya-Azebo Oromo forays into the fringes of the 
desert to the east. The raiders' main object appears to have been 
livestock and stocks of sorghum available in some of the more fertile 
lowland river valleys.15 In mid-October, a group of 2,000 armed men 
from northeast Wag raided eastern Tigray capturing some 8,000 head of 
livestock (cattle and camels) before encountering the soldiers of Dajach 
Abarra Tadla, governor of the area. A violent skirmish followed with some 
five hundred casualties, but the raiders managed to steal off with most 
of their booty intact.16 Emboldened, small groups of raiders continued 
to replenish their diminished herds by attacks on poorly armed lowland 
pas toralis ts. 
This instability along the eastern caravan routes disrupted the flow 
of trade and the excavation of salt in the salt plains at Taltal in 
Tigray and at Wajja in eastern Lasta. The interruption of trade prompted 
the newly crowned Negus Tafari to take action. In mid-November, he 
ordered a close aide, Kagnazmach Fiqre Maryam, to form an expedition at 
the provincial capital of Dase to quell the violence and restore 
security. The negus's fears were justified. The day before the expedition 
departed Dase, raiders attacked a large caravan nearby, killing three 
merchants and making off with a cache of arms .17 By now the raiders 
included groups of Amhara and Tigrean highlanders, as well as Oromo from 
the east. Nor were the raids purely peasant undertakings; regional chiefs 
blamed local officials for collusion in organizing the raids. By the end 
of the year, Fiqre Maryam' s expedition failed, and Tafari commissioned 
another, this time under the command of his son-in-law, Dajach Dasta 
Damtaw. Dasta acted on the assumption that the raids were politically 
motivated and arrested some key local dignitaries.18 
Violence nevertheless continued throughout the winter and spring. To 
avoid raids from the highlands, Afar pastoralists in the arid regions to 
the east of Las ta, Tigray, and Wallo gradually abandoned their normal 
transhumance patterns and fled toward the Eritrean border to the north 
and into the Awash valley to the south. By early April, all of eastern 
Tigray was embroiled in sporadic rebellion, often against their regional 
rulers. Tafari seems to have viewed the disturbances as primarily 
political and ordered the key figures Kabbada Gwangul, Abarra Tadla, and 
Ras Kabbada Mangasha (governors of northeastern districts) to Addis 
Ababa. Only the beginning of the rains in June, however, ended the 
pattern of raids. On 19 June Das ta returned to the capital, having 
accomplished little more than antagonizing local peasants by forcibly 
requisitioning food for his army.19 
By the end of the rains Tafari took a different tack and adopted a 
two-tier policy which addressed local conditions as well as larger 
political considerations. Perhaps he recognized the crisis in the 
northeast as more deep-seated than he had originally thought. During the 
celebration of the feast of Masqal in late September, he issued a 
proclamation suspending for three years the collection of taxes in the 
northeastern areas affected by drought, a move which he probably felt 
would undercut the grassroots support of the political opposition. On the 
8 
more political level, he removed the ailing Ras Kabbada Mangasha, a 
neoconservative of questionable loyalty, from Wallo and replaced him with 
his own son, Assaf a Wassan. As resident governor, he appointed his 
trusted and able cousin Ras Imru.20 In Yajju, located in the key zone 
between Addis Ababa and the rebellious districts, he named Ras Gugsa 
Wale, a descendant of that area's ruling house. He no doubt expected that 
these new appointments plus three months of normal rains would end the 
raids which had disrupted trade and been the source of some embarrassment 
for him with the foreign legations. 
The political dimensions of the 1928-30 rebellion and Ras Gugsa' s 
role specifically have long been problematic in Ethiopian historiography. 
The sequence of events, much less the motivation for Gugsa's challenge to 
Tafari, has never been delineated. Yet they are important in determining 
the nature of the state's response and its subsequent policies throughout 
the north. Ras Gugsa's appointment to his father's old dominion of Yajju 
signaled a final phase of events on the political level. 
Why Tafari would have named Gugsa, his avowed enemy, as governor of a 
key province at the height of the crisis remains something of a mystery. 
Gugsa was clearly one of Tafari's most dangerous rivals both on the level 
of factional politics and personal enmity. Gugsa could rightly blame 
Tafari for separating him from his wife, Empress Zawditu, in 1918 and for 
her gradual estrangement from power at the imperial court.21 While 
little direct evidence exists, most Ethiopians believed, then as now, 
that Gugsa aspired to the imperial throne and each move at the capital 
while strengthened Tafari's party therefore impeded Gugsa's own ambition. 
Gugsa must have been aware of his impotence in the north at considerable 
distance from the capital and decisions that mattered and also of 
Tafari's program to appoint his own loyalists to key governorships. 
Gugsa's appointment to Bagamder had come in 1918 before Tafari had had a 
chance to begin his own program of appointments and, as of 1929, he had 
had no cause to dismiss him.22 
Gugsa's actions in his own governorate and in nearby Lasta are 
instructive about how local elites built support among the rural 
population. Despite his distance from the geographic and political center 
of Ethiopia, Gugsa worked hard from his political capital at Dabra Tabor 
to build his base of support in the central provinces. Well' trained in 
the exercise of local prerogatives, Gugsa carefully cultivated the image 
of a religious ascetic by the scrupulous observance of church holidays 
and the refurbishing of church buildings, and by allowing Bagamder' s 
local elite to maintain control over gult lands and local customs 
revenues. His Yajju family connections and relations with influential 
clergy helped him extend his influence far beyond Bagamder; he was a 
popular figure in Lasta and northern Wallo as well.23 
Notwithstanding the sincerity of his religious beliefs, Gugsa also 
operated shrewdly in the modern political economy. He maintained a close 
accounting of the customs revenues which accrued from the Gallabat post 
on the Sudan border. He also exploited his rights over gult, small state 
plantations (hudad), and corvee labor to build a following among the 
local clergy and soldiery; he also reportedly used public lands to 
produce oxen for local distribution and for sale into the lucrative 
northern livestock trade network.24 Moreover, he ingratiated himself 
with conservatives in Bagamder and at court by appearing to oppose 
foreign penetration of the north. In particular, he made known his 
disapproval of Tafari 's attempts to negotiate a treaty for the British 
construction of a water storage dam on Lake Tana, which the local clergy 
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feared might flood the lake's island monasteries but which had promised 
handsome profits for the central government. In 1929, he detained a lake 
survey party which included the German minister to Addis Ababa, causing 
extreme embarrassment to Tafari.25 Despite this public xenophobia, 
however, Gugsa readily accepted gifts from European visitors, agreed to 
receive secret payments to accede to the dam question, and regularly used 
the Italian consulate at Gondar to transfer payments to his bank accounts 
in Asmara and Addis Ababa.26 
Gugsa's local fiscal and administrative policies also belied his 
image as the ascetic conservative. Peasant cultivators under Gugsa 
including some in western Lasta, paid a number of unique taxes which 
generated considerable wealth for himself and his military elite. In 1921 
he introduced a hut tax to be paid in cash and designed to supplement 
payments to his loyal soldiers. He also stockpiled money and arms in his 
palace treasury in Dabra Tabor.27 Despite these financial and military 
preparations, by 1929 Gugsa was in a weak position to offer a real threat 
to Addis Ababa or the heir apparent. Tafari' s ability to manipulate 
events and personalities at the capital had clearly eclipsed him. 
In view of these factors, it is difficult to explain why Tafari chose 
to expand Gugsa's territory in the midst of a crisis by appointing him to 
the key district of Yajju in the heart of the unrest. Oral sources 
suggest that Gugsa received his appointment as a test of his loyalty. 
Correspondence between the negus and Gugsa seems to support this view. In 
his retrospective autobiography, Hayla Sellase defended his decision: 
since We knew that Yajju was the district in which Ras 
Gugsa had grown up and because of its proximity to 
Bagamder, We transmitted orders to him to go to Yajju 
making amicable appeals to the Wajjerat and Azabo Galla 
and offering them friendly advice as well as urging them 
to abandon their evil works; but if they refuse, he was 
to fight them by military force. We thought, 
incidentally, that if he now tarried with his mission to 
Yajju it would thereby prove that everything of which he 
had been accused, i.e. being in consultation with the 
Italians, was true.28 
With the cessation of the rains in early September 1929, Italian 
consular officials in the north reported that the cycle of violence and 
raiding had begun anew. The central government responded almost 
immediately. On 17 September, Tafari ordered Gugsa to mobilize and march 
to Yajju, whose eastern regions were among the most seriously affected. 
The ras responded quickly by summoning his rural soldiery and the Yajju 
military elite which he had previously settled on gult in Bagamder. He 
crossed friendly territory and arrived at Yajju's capital at Marto by the 
end of the month. From there he moved on to the raiders' stronghold at 
Zobul in the lowlands to the east of Lasta. On 1 October, the government 
tried to use other surrogates to suppress the raids. It ordered Gugsa 
Araya of Tigray to move southeast to maintain order on the Tigray-Lasta 
border, it asked Dajach Ayalaw to advance on Lasta from northern 
Bagamder, and charged Wagshum Kabbada with policing the central plain of 
eastern Lasta. From Lasta the resident Lasta governor, Fitawrari Bazza, 
marched with his army of highland Lastans on Wajja on the main Addis 
Ababa-Asmara road, where he expected to recapture raided livestock.29 
On 16 October, Fitawrari Bazza and his Lasta troops, composed of 
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state officials, loyal military elite, and their retinues, arrived at the 
salt market of Wajja on the eastern escarpment. There they encountered 
some small bands of raiders returning north with captured livestock. 
Bazza I s forces captured the rebels, disarmed them, and confiscated the 
captured cattle which they probably expected to distribute among 
themselves in the highlands. The fitawrari apparently then considered his 
duty to the state concluded and reascended the escarpment with his 
soldiers and booty in tow. On their ascent above the market town of 
Qobbo, Bazza's force met a large group of well armed raiders from 
northeast Las ta and Tigray. In two days of fighting on 22 and 23 of 
October, the rebels surrounded and annihilated the Lastans. The rebels, 
heavily reinforced by local peasant opportunists, killed Bazza and 
emasculated the bodies of the men who had fallen with him. Over 2,000 
rifles and 22,000 cartridges fell into the hands of the rebels. 30 The 
magnitude of this defeat of troops acting for the central government and 
the capture of arms by rebels promoted the further breakdown of state 
authority in the region. 
Gugsa's forces in nearby Zobul took no part in helping Bazza's 
hapless party. In fact, published and archival accounts shed very little 
light on Gugsa's activities at this time. Italian sources claim he 
retreated from the area for lack of water, while French accounts argue 
that he suffered several military setbacks at the hands of rebel forces; 
Hayla Sellase subsequently claimed that Gugsa callously led his men into 
dangerous and disease-ridden lowlands against imperial orders.31 Yet, 
what took place in late October at Zobul was none of these. What did 
happen determined much of the political character of the rebellion as it 
intensified. 
An eyewitness account from one of Gugsa' s soldiers states that, far 
from confronting stiff resistance and poor conditions at Zobul, Gugsa and 
his men enjoyed a warm and festive reception. Three days of feasting - no 
doubt on pilfered beef and mutton - and entertainment followed while 
Gugsa held discussions with rebel leaders. 32 The exact agenda discussed 
by Gugsa and the leadership of the rebel parties at Zobul remains 
unclear, but certainly they reached some sort of understanding; raiding 
from Zobul stopped immediately after Gugsa's mission there, causing some 
sources in the capital to conclude that he had defeated them militarily. 
Gugsa himself informed the government that he left the area because of a 
shortage of water for his men.33 
By December and January, the crisis attained its fullest proportions 
and state authority was at its lowest ebb. The long campaign of raids and 
calls to arms in the northeast had disrupted the rhythm of rural life. 
Also, in those months the prom1s1ng harvests in areas like Yajju, 
northern Wallo, and southeastern Lasta rotted in the fields because of 
unseasonable rain and fog. Italian consular reports indicated a 20 
percent loss in the tef crop, a disaster considering the small margin of 
surplus on which northeastern peasant households depended.34 The 
sporadic raiding which had begun among Oromo lowlanders had blossomed 
into a generalized rural revolt in which even forces representing the 
state participated in the requisitioning of spoils. Raids and resistance 
to government authority covered an area from southern Eritrea to the 
Awash valley and included most of Lasta, southern Tigray, and northern 
Wallo.35 
In Addis Ababa, Negus Tafari continued to see political implications 
in the expanding revolt and began yet another campaign to put down the 
rebels using his northern surrogates. To fill the void left by Fitawrari 
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Bazza's death, he ordered Dajach Ayalaw of northern Bagamder to position 
his Bagamder troops in eastern Lasta to prevent raiding from there. He 
also recalled Ras Gugsa from Yajju and demanded that he meet him at 
Warrailu in northern Wallo. Predictably, Gugsa ignored the order and 
announced his return to Dabra Tabor.36 Gugsa's refusal signaled to 
Tafari that the heretofore general rural discontent had taken the form of 
a direct political challenge. For the first time since the 1916 Battle of 
Sagale, which had brought Tafari to power, an imperial call to arms went 
out in all the provinces and an imperial army began assembling. 
The composition of the imperial army which assembled for the march 
north is instructive about the extent to which Tafari had transformed 
Menilek's state. The best source of evidence is the names of leaders and 
points of origins of the soldiers who made up the expedition. Based on 
this evidence, the imperial army that headed north did not differ 
substantially from that which had advanced to Adwa in 1896, except in two 
aspects. First, the army which departed Addis Ababa on 23 January 1930 
under the command of the Minister of War, Ras Mulugeta, consisted almost 
entirely of troops and leaders from Ethiopia's newly incorporated 
southern provinces. The soldiers were not drawn from the indigenous 
populations there, but were neftenya, northern settlers who depended on 
imperial largesse to maintain their privileged positions as landlords, 
petty administrators, and bearers of low ranking military titles.37 
Although they were not a European-trained and -equipped fighting force 
like Tafari 's personal bodyguard, their presence in the imperial army 
suggests Tafari's success in winning southern governorships for his 
supporters at the expense of neoconservative elements. Second, Tafari did 
not mobilize his own European-supplied and trained troops for the 
northern campaign, perhaps preferring to keep them in reserve to protect 
his position in the capital. He did, however, draw on his external 
sources of supply and sent north his small air command - two Potez and a 
Junkers - which he had wrangled out of his European suitors. These served 
the imperial army well by shuttling messages and personnel between Addis 
Ababa, Dase, and the imperial army camp, as well as providing invaluable 
intelligence on the movements of rebel troops.38 
On 15 January 1930, Tafari issued orders to his northern surrogates, 
Ras Gugsa Araya, Wagshum Kabbada, and Dajach Ayalaw to assemble their 
troops and march further east into the troubled lowland zones. That few 
peasant soldiers in the north responded to the government's new 
mobilization call was indicative of the generalized nature of the revolt. 
Many had already joined small-scale raiding parties or the more organized 
rebel army of Ras Gugsa.39 
Meanwhile, Gugsa had committed himself to a direct confrontation with 
the central government and had begun a campaign to win the hearts and 
minds of northern Ethiopians. To accomplish this task, he drew heavily on 
the ideological and material weapons at his disposal. In the churches of 
Bagamder, Lasta, and northern Wallo, sermons took a decidedly political 
theme as large numbers of northern clergy whose education Gugsa had 
sponsored at Dabra Tabor's important liturgical center returned to their 
home parishes and passed on the ras's message that Tafari had sold out to 
the foreigners and was on the --;;;-rge of a conversion to Catholicism.40 
Gugsa also bid for the support of the peasant population by suspending 
the collection of tithe and substituting the payment of one jar of grain 
for each pair of oxen owned. This collection was to be made by locally 
elected officials (chiqashums) and not by the state agents, whom the 
rural population often resented.41 Gugsa probably expected this policy 
to win over the lower ranks of the peasantry 
middle-rank officials, many of whom had maintained 
state. 
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and undermine those 
loyalty to the Shawan 
These efforts appear to have had initial success. On 12 January 1930 
in the midst of harvest local officials, large landholders 
(balabats), and priests from Wadla, Dalanta, and Yajju (all parts of 
Wallo) came together and agreed not to pay taxes to the collectors 
appointed for their area by the imperial government. They vowed in the 
name of Ras Gugsa to fight any agents who attempted to collect revenues 
from the harvest. A similar group assembled at Dabra Tabor on 26 January 
to take oaths of loyalty to Gugsa.42 
Gugsa also maintained an active secret correspondence with his 
potential allies in the north, Ras Gugsa Araya and Ras Siyum Mangasha of 
Tigray and Ras Haylu of Gojjam, whose own discontent with events at the 
capital probably led Gugsa to believe that he could count on their 
support when he chose to move against the government. Some foreign 
observers at the capital had already concluded that the raiding 
constituted sufficient evidence of their collusion.43 Direct evidence 
of a conspiracy did, in fact, exist. In late 1929, an agent of Ras Kassa 
in Lasta had intercepted a message from Gugsa to Ras Siyum calling on the 
Tigrean to Join a united northern front against Tafari.44 Italian 
agents with Haylu reported that the Gojjame was in constant communication 
with Gugsa. 
At the same time he drummed up support for his imperial ambitions in 
the north, Gugsa maintained a conciliatory tone with Addis Ababa. In a 
series of letters to Tafari and Zawditu between June 1929 and March 1930, 
later published in the national press, Gugsa offered reconciliation, but 
expressed the fear that he might be imprisoned for his disobedience. On 
25 February, Gugsa telegraphed a set of conditions which he demanded in 
return for agreeing to meet Tafari.45 Neither side, however, had any 
intention of accepting a reconciliation: Gugsa had probably decided after 
reaching Zobul in September of 1929 to mobilize his support and to 
challenge the central government. He must have realized that he had 
already gone too far for the central government to allow him to retain 
his governorship of Bagamder, much less allow him to extend his holdings 
to include Yajju. From Tafari' s point of view, a reconciliation would 
serve no useful purpose as it would only have sustained an enemy that the 
negus wanted eliminated. The imperial army had mobilized and marched and 
there was no reason not to use the opportunity to gain permanent control 
of the north. For his part, Gugsa' s efforts to raise an army and to 
enlist the support of his northern compatriots had continued unabated.46 
Meanwhile, raiding activities continued through February and March; 
most northern soldiers refused to obey the imperial calls to arms, 
prompting an intensification of the campaign against them. On 3 February, 
loyal troops under Wagshum Kabbada met a group of rebels near Dayo in 
northeast Lasta, putting them to flight and burning five of their 
villages while taking prisoners and recapturing some 500 head of 
livestock.47 Ras Gugsa Araya, a member of the Tigray royal family, 
pursued a similarly aggressive policy on the behalf of the imperial 
government in eastern Tigray while other loyal troops had moved on the 
salt trade center of Wajja where they burned alleged rebel villages and 
killed bands of raiders they encountered. These forays allowed them to 
avenge the death of Fitawrari Bazza, but also to provision themselves on 
what remained of the livestock and grain stores of eastern Lasta.48 In 
most ways that mattered to rural Lastans, punitive expeditions had the 
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same effect as raids. Wandering soldiers requisitioned food, animals, and 
labor. Despite this form of repression and the approach of an imperial 
army from Addis Ababa, rebels continued to operate. As late as 17 March, 
Oromo raiders attacked and burned Dildi, an important trade settlement on 
the Lasta-Yajju road.49 
On 22 February, Ras Mulugeta's army arrived in Dase. His forces 
numbered some 2,000 men with seven machine guns and five artillery 
pieces. A few days later, two additional imperial forces under Dajach 
Berru of Sidamo and Dajach Wandbawassan, Ras Kassa' s son, reinforced 
Mulugeta. 50 As these troops massed in northern Wallo, the negus 's two 
airplanes shuttled information about rebel movements to the imperial army 
camp and to Dase. Sometime between 22 and 25 March, Gugsa broke off his 
negotiations with Ras Mulugeta and marched out of Dabra Tabor towards the 
left bank of the Takkaze.51 
The events of the last few weeks and Gugsa's motivation for choosing 
a military solution are vague. Despite his best efforts, Gugsa seems to 
have been unable to turn local movements of resistance into a coordinated 
action against the central state. Lastans and northern Ethiopians cared 
less who was emperor than they did about preserving the socio-economic 
fabric of the local community and the economic viability of their 
households. Moreover, Negus Tafari I s own campaign of counter-propaganda 
in Bagamder, Lasta, and northern Wallo seems to have been effective in 
the final weeks of the rebellion and none of Gugsa' s putative allies 
chose to join him. The Tigrean leaders waited and watched from afar. Ras 
Siyum played a very small role in the prosecution of raiding from his 
position in western Tigray. Gugsa Araya, on the other hand, had already 
gained considerable economic leverage by playing the role of defender of 
the central state. Except for his actions against raiders in the second 
half of February 1930, his support had amounted to a huge round-up of 
livestock, captured from raiders or raided by his own troops, and the 
consolidation of new territories which he hoped to keep once hostilities 
subsided. Italian sources claim that by the time he reached his capital 
at Maqale in March 1930, he had collected 100,000 head of livestock.52 
Gugsa Wale's closest and most opportunistic ally, Ras Haylu of 
Gojjam, wavered until the last moment before prudently bowing out. In 
March the Gojjame obliquely signalled his feelings to Gugsa. Having heard 
that Gugsa had lost many mules - an essential part of a military force -
in the Zobul campaign, Haylu sent a message with his warmest regards, 
saying that he had sent replacements. When the herd of gangly yearlings 
arrived at Gugsa's camp, Haylu's message was immediately clear: the time 
was not yet right and Gugsa could expect no help from Haylu.53 When he 
marched against the imperial army at the end of March, Gugsa was badly 
outgunned and outnumbered. 
On 30 March Gugsa finally confronted the imperial forces under Ras 
Mulugeta at Aynchem, near the town of Dabra Zabit in western Lasta. A 
reconnaissance by the imperial airplanes showed his troops were 
outnumbered three to one. Even though he was aware of the odds through 
his own sources, Gugsa had three days earlier rejected an offer of 
mediation made by the priests of Lalibala. In the battle that followed, 
Gugsa's troops lost heavily. The ras himself died in a hail of rifle fire 
as he led a desperate charge on the Shawan lines well after the battle 
had been lost. Victorious imperial forces moved quickly to Gugsa's 
capital at Dabra Tabor, where they uncovered huge caches of arms and 
money as well as correspondence between the Gugsa and his northern 
colleagues. 54 
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Why Gugsa chose to confront such overwhelming forces remains an 
enigma. That he desperately wanted the throne was clear to his soldiery, 
but he had been aware well before the battle that his allies had 
abandoned him. Gugsa's act was therefore one of pure desperation; it 
symbolized the impotence of the once-powerful northern elite in resisting 
the power of the central state. Gugsa's soldiers had their own 
explanation for their leader's actions. The lament sung as they left the 
battlefield was classic Amharic double entendre: 
Abba Daldel Gugsa anta bechhen nah Shawochu bezu nachaw: 
Yiradugn belah naw yatadabalaqahachaw 
Father of Daldel [his horse] Gugsa, you are alone and 
the Shawana are many; 
You fought them and pleaded for help. 
[You fought them and pleaded to be slaughtered.] 
The song plays upon the homonym infinitive mardat, to help or to 
slaughter, and clearly suggests the idea of a death wish.55 
Whatever Gugsa's motives may have been, or the final outcome of that 
particular battle, the northern Ethiopian elite lacked the wherewithal to 
resist control over the Shawan center. Lacking direct access to the Red 
Sea, the north could not obtain modern arms in sufficient quantity to 
challenge the imperial army. Nor did the northern economies of ,Lasta, 
Tigray, or Bagamder produce enough marketable commodities to pay for 
them. The guerilla warfare of raiding and harrassment was 
counterproductive; supporting soldiers, absorbing reprisals, and having 
peasant soldiers away from their homesteads for long periods disrupted 
the delicate equilibrium of trade and agriculture. 
The battle of Aynchem triggered a new round of violence, but this 
time in the central highlands and with the blessing of the central 
government. Immediately after the fighting, the Minister of War ordered 
the rebels punished, especially those in western Yajju and Lasta who had 
supported Gugsa most strongly. Indiscriminate looting started immediately 
by soldiers of the imperial army searching for the spoils of war. Many of 
the raiders were highland Lastans who had crossed the Takkaze in search 
of livestock. 56 After eighteen months of quartering troops, responding 
to calls to arms, and fighting off locust swarms, they were eager to 
replenish herds and to participate in the booty taking. The raiders 
stripped bare areas like Wadla, Dalanta, Maqet, and Shadaho before 
recrossing the Takkaze. 
Epilogue: Rural Rebellion at the Grassroots 
Taken as a whole, the events in northeast Ethiopia in the 1928-30 
period and in the next five years represent more than a reaction to 
political events at the capital. Just as in an earlier 1917-19 rebellion 
in Wag and Tigr~y, environmental conditions were responsible for 
disrupting the agricultural cycle which in better years would have tied 
producers to plowing, harvesting, land litigation, or the business of 
capitalizing an independent household.57 In the spring of 1927, when 
drought and locusts hit eastern zones of Lasta and its environs, reduced 
herds and poor prospects for harvests released young men from 
agricultural tasks to engage in raids against the neighboring lowlands, 
ranging into adjacent lowland areas in search of livestock, grain, and 
15 
prestige. Taxes in arrears in these zones had already put some tension on 
the relationship between rural producers and elite. The delicate 
household economy of rural producers in the northeast could not have 
withstood the dual pressures of taxation and low productivity. 
In these circumstances, politics first intervened at a sub-regional 
level when ambitious large landholders (balabats) or military elite 
sought to channel producer anxiety into the opportunity to exercise 
power. Organizing raiding parties became a way to obtain a following 
which might later be parlayed into the privileges of rural elite, as 
bandit leaders have shown throughout recent Ethiopian history. 58 Those 
leaders of raiding parties who are clearly identified in the sources 
were, in fact, already members of the rural elite. Far from being an 
early manifestation of class consciousness, raiding parties consisted of 
vertically based coalitions of rural strata. Desperate producers left 
their homesteads and followed their landlords, local military officers, 
and subdistrict chiefs in raids to enhance their prestige in the local 
community and to obtain the means of survival. Conditions had indeed 
increased the vulnerability of rural households, but the rural population 
expressed discontent along lines which were culturally defined. In the 
northern Ethiopian political culture, one sought allies in positions of 
power greater than one's own, not within one's own stratum. 59 Peasants 
did not intend to react in new ways; rather they conformed to patterns of 
rebellion more likely to protect household subsistence and consistent 
with the north's ingrained political culture. Political maneuverings by 
Ras Gugsa, local agents of the state, and the leadership of the local 
raiding parties were therefore responding to the severe disruption of the 
cycle of production at the household and regional level. 
The end results of the cycle of violence, raiding, and repression 
affected rural classes in Lasta in different ways; but the effects bore 
little relation to whether or not one supported the central state or 
joined a rebel group. At the top of the social system, rural elites who 
either led raids or punitive expeditions and the military class which 
accompanied them gained significant advantages by being able to 
redistribute raided or recaptured goods among their followers. There is 
little evidence of any direct punishment of raiders and few of the 
imperial forces or the raiders returned the goods, livestock, or grain 
taken during the fighting. 
The process of mobilization in the countryside put a great deal of 
stress on the organization of production and distribution. Lastans, for 
example, underwent at least three calls to arms during the 1928-30 
period. Orders to gather arms and provisions for a campaign originated 
with state officials and filtered down through the rural strata to the 
parish and household level. Officers and titled officials gathered their 
retainers around them and called on those peasant soldiers who enjoyed 
tax-free status. Locally elected officials, known as chiqashums, 
organized the call-up at the local level and collected food from those 
not eligible for service. About one-third of rural males had military 
obligations, another third performed labor services, and the remaining 
group remained on the land for agricultural work. 60 Raiding or hunting 
parties were organized along similar lines. Rural households not only 
provided manpower for the troops or raiding parties raised from their 
community, but also bore responsibility for feeding other troops passing 
through their area. The peculiar nature of the 1928-30 crisis in the 
northeast is that household heads and young men remained mobilized 
throughout the planting and harvesting seasons and also supported large 
bands of roving soldiers. 
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Between November 1929 and April 1930, the army of Dajach Ayalaw 
occupied southern Lasta. During that half-year which included the key 
harvest months of December and January, Ayalaw's troops subsisted on the 
grain and livestock of the area's peasant population. Lasta households 
also provided fodder for pack animals, as well as wood and dung for fuel 
- two scarce commodities in the northeast.61 Given the poor harvests 
reported for that year in eastern Lasta, much of the grain consumed by 
the soldiers must have been intended for the following year's planting. 
Paradoxically, grain prices in northeastern markets dropped during the 
period of the crisis. Italian reports claimed that peasants rushed what 
grain they had to market at a low price to avoid its being 
requisitioned.62 
In the end, those who chose to fight fared better than those who 
remained on the land. Herds and stocks of grain taken by raiders were a 
net loss to producers. Even the herds which government-appointed forces 
recaptured never returned to their original owners. Ras Gugsa Araya I s 
collection of livestock was indicative of the activities of others, 
albeit on a smaller scale, who saw the breakdown of civil authority as an 
opportunity to augment their supply of rural capital in the form of 
livestock - especially oxen and camels. In fact, many of the soldiers who 
accompanied these two loyal agents of the central government had 
themselves begun the hostilities as raiders.63 Rural elites who 
controlled the distribution of this booty, in effect, were able to assume 
influential positions when peaceful conditions returned and the demand 
for draft animals resumed. Based on my own interviews with those who 
worked the land and recent data on highland farming systems, it is 
possible to conclude that the ability to loan oxen may have been the 
quickest means to economic mobility in the northeast since recent studies 
of farming systems in the area suggest that access to both land and labor 
flowed to those who controlled oxen.64 
The southern-based soldiery which made up the bulk of the imperial 
army made out significantly better than their northern counterparts. In 
April of 1930, the Italian agent at Dase reported that the troops 
returning south after the Battle of Anychem were well fed and equipped, 
having looted caches of grains, arms, donkeys, and horses as booty. The 
raided livestock the army brought with it temporarily flooded the market 
at Dase where returning imperial soldiers sold cattle at one per taler 
and exchanged five sheep for one rifle cartridge - one-fifteenth of the 
normal price.65 
The army which had marched with the minister of war and grown fat on 
booty was not the modern force built by Tafari to protect his own 
interests in the capital; that force had remained with him in the 
capital. Rather it was a Menilek-style irregular army consisting of 
soldier/settlers from southern provinces over whom Tafari had extended 
his influence. By mobilizing this force and sending them north, the negus 
had stood Ethiopian history on its head by employing first- and 
second-generation northern migrants to pacify their former home areas. By 
using these soldier/settlers, Tafari had also preserved his own 
European-trained force and tested the loyalty of his southern governors 
whom he had asked to contribute to the effort. The expedition's success 
was an affirmation of his decade-long strategy of building a 
southern-base of support. The entire process confirmed northern 
Ethiopia's move out of the political limelight. 
The real losers were rural farmers who had lost much of their means 
of livelihood. Migration out of the area accelerated in following years 
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and the conditions for agriculture never recovered. If the political end 
result of the 1928-30 events was the formal end of northern political 
pre tent ions, the agonizing process of rebellion and its suppression had 
severely weakened the viability of the rural economy of Lasta and other 
affected regions. 
Conclusion 
Ras Gugsa' s death removed the last major obstacle to Negus Tafari' s 
empire-wide consolidation of political power. That Empress Zawditu died a 
day after her husband of a case of aggravated diabetes was a stroke of 
luck. The negus turned this peculiar piece of good fortune into political 
capital and was crowned Emperor Hayla Sellase I with full powers of 
government in November 1930. 66 The policies which the central 
government instituted in the north between the Battle of Aynchem and the 
1935 Italian invasion reflected the new Ethiopian political economy 
focused on the economic and administrative needs of Addis Ababa and the 
growing bureaucratic class resident there. The circumstances of the 
revolt in the northeast and subsequent maneuverings by the emperor had 
allowed the central government to extend its political control over a 
large portion of the old empire and consolidate its program of fiscal and 
economic control begun a decade earlier. 
The politics of Ras Tafari 's rise to power in the 1920s and his 
consolidation of the position of the central government in the 1930-35 
period as Emperor Hayla Sellase created a new environment for the 
political economy of northern Ethiopia. By bringing the political and 
economic structure of the north more directly under the purview of the 
central state, Addis Ababa profoundly affected circumstances under which 
the rural household and institutions of distribution operated. Taken as a 
whole, the rural rebellion of 1928-30 was a frenetic last-ditch effort to 
resist these incursions at both the level of politics - Gugsa's rebellion 
- and at the grassroots level: the campaign of localized raids must be 
understood in the context of the goals of rural producers and the nature 
of the local political culture, and the weakness of the area's 
agricultural base. Nor did the chronic problems of population pressure on 
the land, poor weather conditions, or capital dependency subside. No 
longer the political force it had once been in Ethiopian history, 
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